{"id":22794,"date":"2026-09-21T15:54:42","date_gmt":"2026-09-21T15:54:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cybersummit.io\/?p=22794"},"modified":"2026-09-21T15:54:44","modified_gmt":"2026-09-21T15:54:44","slug":"computacion-cuantica-chile-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cybersummit.io\/en\/computacion-cuantica-chile-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Quantum Computing: What the science panel in Chile left in 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"

Quantum computing ceased to be a laboratory topic and became an urgent task for any industrial cybersecurity team. That was the main theme of the scientific panel at the Industrial Cyber Summit Chile 2026<\/strong>, held on September 3 at the Hilaria Center in Santiago.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Flavia M\u00e9ndez,<\/strong> founder and CEO of Cyber Summit<\/a>, She moderated a talk that she herself described as her favorite panel of the event: it brought three researchers who study quantum physics, artificial intelligence, and autonomous system security from the lab to the decision-making table of any CISO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

M\u00e9ndez opened by citing an Argentine physicist, Juan Pablo Paz, who maintains that quantum physics must be explained at least ten times in order for it to make sense. She is already in her third year and continues to learn new things.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That mixture of humility and urgency set the tone of the panel, which was composed of Dr. Paulina Assmann<\/strong> (astrophysicist, co-founder of Sequre Quantum and of the Quantum Hub Chile), the Dr. Jer\u00f3nimo Maze<\/strong> (a Harvard-educated physicist, a quantum computing researcher at the Catholic University) and Tom\u00e1s Vera<\/strong> (Candidate for a PhD in Computer Science from the University of Chile and scientific advisor of Congreso Futuro).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From guitar strings to RSA keys<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Maze opened with the most basic and at the same time most uncomfortable question: What is, in reality, a quantum computer?<\/strong> His explanation avoided jargon: Whereas a classical bit can only be in either zero or one, a qubit can exist in a superposition of both states.<\/strong>, It's like a guitar string that vibrates in different modes at the same time. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The practical consequence is enormous: describing just ten quantum particles takes an ordinary computer hours, and with about 300 qubits the system has more possible states than there are atoms in the observable universe. No traditional computer can simulate that, and that limitation was what Richard Feynman turned into a reverse question decades ago: if we can't simulate quantum nature, can we use it to have it simulate our calculations?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That's where the problem for any cybersecurity team comes in: the Shor algorithm<\/strong>, capable of factoring the prime numbers on which RSA encryption is based. As Maze explained, Breaking an RSA key with a mature quantum computer could take between 10 seconds and 7 months.<\/strong>. The same task, on a modern classic computer, would take about 300 trillion years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Method<\/th>Estimated time to break an RSA key<\/th><\/tr><\/thead>
Current classic computer<\/td>~300 billion years<\/td><\/tr>
Mature quantum computer<\/td>Between 10 seconds and 7 months<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Source: Estimates presented by Dr. Jer\u00f3nimo Maze at the scientific panel of the Industrial Cyber Summit Chile 2026.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the same physics that threatens cryptography also offers a way out. The non-cloning theorem states that a quantum state cannot be copied without altering it.<\/strong>, This means that if someone intercepts a communication transmitted over a quantum channel, that intrusion is immediately detected and the transmission can be discarded and repeated. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00abThe quantum,\u00bb summarized Maze, \u00abat the same time delivers an unprecedented computing power and a form of communication impossible to spy on without leaving a trace.\u00bb <\/p>\n\n\n\n

When AI speeds everything up, for better or for worse<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Tom\u00e1s Vera intervened to talk about a problem that is no longer hypothetical: open-ended, unrestricted artificial intelligence models can be used both to compromise computer systems and to compromise biology. He gave a real and disturbing example: There are families that have made public the genetic sequence of a child with a degenerative disease in order to ask for help from the scientific community.<\/strong>, And that same information, cross-referenced with models like Google DeepMind's AlphaFold, could guide the search for pathogens designed for a specific organism. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00abIf we add to that the computing capacity of a quantum computer,\u00bb warned Vera, \u00abthe radius of attack no longer limits itself to critical digital infrastructure to include specific individuals.\u00bb <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The flip side of the coin is that The same AI accelerates the science behind quantum computing<\/strong>Current models are especially good at finding counterexamples in complex mathematical problems, which helps in the design of new quantum algorithms. The technology that amplifies the risk is the same that pushes the scientific frontier.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u00abQ Day\u00bb has ceased to be a distant date<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Paulina Assmann took the conversation to the field of geopolitics. The so-called \u00abQ Day\u00bb \u2014 the moment a quantum computer would be able to break current cryptography \u2014 was estimated for 2030 just a year ago; today the United States is handling projections from 2027 to 2028.<\/strong>. \u00abThere is no set date,\u00bb clarified Assmann, but the pace of progress requires preparations to be made in advance, something that NIST has been doing since it began working with the world\u2019s leading cryptographers in 2014. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In August 2024, the organization formalized its first three post-quantum cryptography standards. These are not algorithms that are used \u00abafter\u00bb quantum computing; rather, they are algorithms designed so that no quantum computer can easily solve them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The question that every organization should ask itself, according to Assmann, is not when Day Q arrives, but what data or operations need to remain confidential in two, five, or fifteen years. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The reason is a well-documented strategy known as \u00abharvest now, decrypt later,\u00bb in which malicious actors capture encrypted information today with the intention of decrypting it as soon as they can. If that data remains relevant when that moment arrives, it\u2019s already too late to protect it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Migrating to post-quantum cryptography isn\u2019t changing a box<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

One of the key points of the panel was the message that Migrating to post-quantum cryptography \u2014or becoming \u00abquantum safe\u00bb\u2014 is not solved by buying a specific product.<\/strong>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00abIt's not just about changing a box: first you have to understand the infrastructure, then you have to buy the technology,\u00bb summarized Assmann. It's a change that goes from end to end; from how encryption keys are generated to how data travels. It's not a software update.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Chile already has a foot in the scientific race that supports all of this.<\/strong>. Maze said that, with funding from ANID through an Anillo project, his team is developing the first Chilean quantum computer based on neutral atoms. The initial goal is modest \u2014 just two qubits \u2014 because building it requires mastering complex laboratory technology, such as laser tuning. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ultimate goal is not to compete with powers that already possess hundreds of qubits; rather, it is to build the human capital that will enable the country to adopt this technology on its own terms in the future, something that also appeared, in a regional context, in the panel discussion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Governing AI before the surprise comes at a cost<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Towards the end, Tom\u00e1s Vera offered a concrete guide for organizations that are adopting AI without adding more risk than they are willing to accept. First, address the \u00abshadow AI\u00bb: use root certificates in firewalls to detect when someone in the company uses services like OpenAI, Anthropic, or Grok without authorization, relying on open frameworks like Plano to govern what instructions are authorized. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second, a cultural change: preventing inexperienced people from validating AI responses on critical issues, something Vera compared to using a language model to interpret one's own blood tests without the clinical judgment to judge whether the response makes sense. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thirdly, build your own \u00abharness\u00bb around the generalist models, tailored to the tasks of each business: according to the studies cited by Vera, a good harness improves performance by more than 40% and incorporates business knowledge that the competition cannot copy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Three steps that Assmann recommends taking today<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

To conclude, Assmann summarized the quantum agenda in three movements. The first is to make a complete cryptographic inventory<\/strong>: Map where encryption is used within the organization, considering each layer \u2014from key generation to data transport\u2014 using \u00abquantum safe\u00bb encryption. The second is Identify which data or processes are sensitive today<\/strong> and they will continue to be so in the coming years, and talk to the suppliers as soon as possible, because such a migration is sustained over time and cannot be improvised. The third, less well-known, is Understand that \u00abquantum safe\u00bb also includes the randomness used within cryptographic algorithms<\/strong>, Today, this can be generated in a quantum way and audited in real time. Artificial intelligence, added Assmann, is a natural ally at this stage: it is especially good at finding patterns and mapping complete infrastructures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That combination, according to the three panelists, is the only way to be on the right side of cybersecurity in critical infrastructures when the quantum race finally accelerates.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

M\u00e9ndez closed the panel with a summary that could well be the agenda of any security team for the rest of the decade. In addition to detecting attacks and generating awareness on a daily basis, it is also necessary to work on the technological contingency plan, the governance of AI, and quantum preparedness at the same time. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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La computaci\u00f3n cu\u00e1ntica dej\u00f3 de ser un tema de laboratorio para convertirse en tarea urgente de cualquier equipo de ciberseguridad industrial. Ese fue el hilo conductor del panel cient\u00edfico del…<\/p>","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":22797,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[9],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-22794","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-tecnologia-e-innovacion"],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t